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THE SECURITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A THIRD
PHASE IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM?
James A.R. Nafziger*
In 1989, when history blew out the candles on the 200th anniver-
sary of the French Revolution and a draft Bill of Rights for the
United States, the winds of change swept over Eastern Europe. It
was a particularly significant arena for a living tribute to the two
events in 1789 that had forged the modern link between human
rights and national security. Just as the world was never the same
after 1789, so the dramatic triumph of human rights aspirations in
1989 confirms a trend that may profoundly shape the international
regime of global security into one of multilateralism and reliance
on the promotion and protection of human rights.
The international foundation for Eastern Europe's spectacular
commemoration of the link between security and human rights was
largely in place by the beginning of 1989. By then, a relaxation of
East-West tensions, broader consensus on the essence of global
human rights, and a much stronger role for United Nations peace-
making and peacekeeping instilled greater confidence among the
Powers in a future of diversity, democracy and dialogue. Symboli-
cally, the fortieth anniversary in 1988 of both the Organization of
American States and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the thirtieth anniversary of the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission highlighted the relationship between international se-
curity and human rights. The East-West agreement reached in
1989 at the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe' acknowledges the same relationship by blend-
ing them within the framework of the Helsinki Accords.2 If the
recent past is prologue, there is every reason to expect that these
kinds of links between international security and human rights will
become an inseparable part of the chain of future events.
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law.
I. Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 [-89] of Representatives of the
Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the
Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, 28
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 531 (1989).
2. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, reprinted in 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
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Indeed, the protection of human rights would seem to offer the
best long-range assurance of regional and global security. Over a
hundred years ago the Mexican statesman, Benito Juarez, was
clear about the relationship between security and human rights: "El
respeto al derecho ajeno es la paz."3 Recently another eminent
Mexican, Octavio Paz, emphasized the close link between security
and democracy." In more specific terms James Billington, the Li-
brarian of Congress, has written that "out of the large literature on
how wars start in the modern world, there emerges one heartening
fact: democracies do not fight one another."5
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GLOBAL SECURITY
The events of 1989 accelerated a trend toward an international
legal regime based on an acknowledged relationship between inter-
national security and human rights. The world appears to be enter-
ing a new, third phase in the global system of security within the
United Nations framework. To preface discussion about this trend,
it will be instructive to look briefly at recent developments in global
security. Clearly, we are living in a significant period. Although
there are clouds on the horizon and "peace in our time" still seems
quixotic, "peace," in the words of Colin Powell, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, "is on the march around the world."'
Consider what happened in the realm of peacekeeping as the
1980s ended. Under a United Nations-arranged agreement, which
was a kind of Christmas present at the end of 1988, South Africa
agreed to independence for Namibia in return for withdrawal of
Cuban troops from neighboring Angola. 7 The Geneva Accords re-
3. Quoted in, e.g., J. MCHENRY, A SHORT HISTORY OF MEXIco 202 (1970). As the
product of Juarez's liberal-reformist thinking, this aphorism has been widely quoted to jus-
tify both individual ("human") rights in national society and sovereign rights in international
relations. It has therefore served as a basis in Mexico both for civil rights and liberties and
for principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Left uncertain is its message when-
ever the use of force may be necessary to vindicate human rights. It appears, however, that
domestically, at least, Juarez was prepared to use force to establish his reforms ("La
Reforma") on behalf of human rights.
4. "It is logical and political error, as well as a moral failing, to dissociate peace and
democracy . . . in its simplest and most essential expression, democracy is dialogue, and
dialogue paves the way for peace. . . . By fighting for democracy, dissidents are fighting for
peace-fighting for all of us." 0. PAZ, ONE EARTH, FOUR OR FIVE WORLDS 212 (1985).
5. Billington, Realism and Vision in American Foreign Policy, 65 FOR. AFF. 630, 652
(1986).
6. Interdependent, Dec. - Jan. 1988-89, at 1, col. I.
7. Freeman, The Anglo/Namibia Accords, 68 FOR. AFF. 126 (1989); Smith, A Diplo-
matic Success in Africa, Christ. Sci. Monitor, Dec. 19, 1988, at 12, col. 1.
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suited in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.' Iraq
and Iran were slowly, if somewhat precariously, implementing a
ceasefire in their ten-year war.' Morocco and the Polisario guerril-
las accepted a United Nations plan to bring peace to the Western
Sahara and to conduct a referendum on self-determination there.10
On August 7, 1989 the Tela Conference of Central American lead-
ers approved plans for a three-part United Nations peacemaking-
peacekeeping operation in Central America. 1 The same month
Libya and Chad signed an accord ending fifteen years of conflict. 2
Although Cambodian peace negotiations have progressed slowly,
the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 witnessed the installa-
tion of a process for peace that is supported in principle by such
adversaries as China, which has usually been skeptical about U.N.
peacekeeping, and Vietnam, which seems to prefer a U.N. settle-
ment in Cambodia to a return to domination by the Khmer
Rouge. 3 Finally, South Korean President Roh suggested that the
United Nations use its good offices to convene a six-nation confer-
ence for opening up dialogue between the two Koreas."4
In view of these developments, it is not surprising that support
for the United Nations is once again substantial, according to pub-
lic opinion polls in the United States.' 5 The U.N.'s peacekeeping
operations help explain its current popularity. The award of the
1988 Nobel Peace Prize to those forces reminded the world not
only of the Nobel Committee's wisdom, but the key role that mili-
tary troops continue to play in security. It is, however, remarkable
that the military peacekeepers conduct their operations based on a
minimal use of force, always with the consent of the parties con-
cerned, and firing their arms only in self-defense. In the words of
Secretary General P6rez de Cu6llar, "[n]ever before in history have
military forces been employed internationally not to wage war, not
to establish domination, and not to serve the interests of any Power
or group of Powers, but rather to prevent conflict between peo-
8. See Morello, The UN reopens with a little more peace, a little more money,
Christ. Sci. Monitor, Sept. 20, 1988, at 9, col. 1.
9. Id.; see also Kemp, Middle East Opportunities, 68 FOR.AFF. 139, 144 (1989)..
10. Christ. Sci. Monitor, Sept. 21, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
11. Marcello, Path Cleared for UN Peacekeepers in Central America, Christ. Sci.
Monitor, Aug. 15, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
12. Christ. Sci. Monitor, Sept. 1, 1989, at 3, col. 1. The parties agreed to submit a
territorial dispute to international arbitration.
13. See Porter, Cambodia: Sihanouk's Initiative, 66 FOR. AFF. 809, 817-18 (1988); La
Franchi, A UN Role for Cambodia, Christ. Sci. Monitor, Jan. 18, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
14. Chase, Inescapable Entanglements 67 FOR. An'., Winter 1988/89, at 26, 28.
15. See, e.g.,. Interdependent, Spring 1989, at 3, col. 1.
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pies." 6 But is this the last word in global security?
A. A Brief History of Global Security Efforts Within the
United Nations
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter17 was to have been
the cornerstone of an ambitious new system of collective security
(the "first phase"), based on the organization of a permanent mili-
tary force to deter or respond to threats to the peace, breaches of
the peace, and acts of aggression. The short career of this system of
collective security began and ended with the Korean War, and then
only as a result of two unchartered developments: the Uniting for
Peace Resolution of the General Assembly' 8 and domination by the
armed forces of one Member, the United States. The fragility of
regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter, 9 as well as the failure of the five Permanent Members of
the Security Council to agree on the composition, command struc-
ture, territorial facilities and conditions for action of a permanent
force, led to the present, so-called "second phase" of post-War se-
curity. Instead of the prescribed system of collective security, a
stronger role for the Secretary General and a more active General
Assembly have combined to cast the U.N. in the role of a watchdog
over international disputes, a peacemaker and peacekeeper after the
event of conflict, and a facilitator of disarmament and peaceful dis-
pute resolution under Article 220 and Chapter VII x of the Charter.
16. U.N. Chron., Mar. 1989, at 30 (emphasis added).
17. U.N. CHARTER clh. VII ("Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of
the peace, and acts of aggression.")
18. 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950);
that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent mem-
bers, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the
matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Mem-
bers for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of
aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may
meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor.
Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council
on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United
Nations.
19. U.N. CHARTER ch. VIII arts. 52-54 provide for "Regional arrangements" and their
relationship with United Nations action.
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras 3-5 provide as follows:
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
[Vol. 20
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To date, the United Nations has been involved in one campaign
of collective-security, seventeen peacekeeping operations and mili-
tary observer missions (the latter are unarmed), and two cases of
collective sanctions, against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.22
About 500,000 troops and other personnel from 58 nations have
been involved. Today, the U.N. maintains ten active peacekeeping
and military observer missions involving about 20,000 persons. Un-
til 1988 all of these missions were located within a crescent, per-
haps more accurately described as a scimitar, which extends be-
tween Cyprus and India. On the western end of the crescent is the
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), whose more than
2,000 troops and civilian police provide a buffer between Greek and
Turkish-speaking sectors of that island. To the east, the United Na-
tions Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), with 300 observ-
ers, reports from Jerusalem on hostilities there, in Israel and four
Arab states. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), whose
5,850 troops constitute the U.N.'s second largest mission, patrols
south Lebanon. The U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UN-
DOF), with 1,350 troops and observers, implements the cease-fire
between Israel and Syria.
The baby of the Middle Eastern family, still getting used to the
hot bathwater of the Persian Gulf, is the U.N. Iran-Iraq Military
Observer Group (UNIIMOG), whose 350 observers and 480 sup-
port troops seek to establish and maintain a ceasefire line. Still far-
ther to the east, another toddler, the U.N. Good Offices Mission in
Afghanistan (UNGOMAP), with 50 observers, implements the Ge-
neva accords in Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the easternmost
flank, the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP), which is the oldest mission, helps keep the peace
between those two countries by patrolling the rugged western
Himalayas with a staff of just 38.
Outside the crescent between Cyprus and India are the eighth,
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes
in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventative or enforcement
action.
21. U.N. CHARTER ch. VI ("Peaceful settlement of disputes").
22. On the details that follow, see the concise summary and map of the first seven
peacekeeping groups, in Morello, U.N. tallies the costs of peace, Christ. Sci. Monitor, Aug.
22, 1988, at 7, col. I; see also Piasecki, What price peace? Interdependent, Dec. - Jan. 1988-
89, at 1, col. 2.
1990)
5
Nafziger: The Security of Human Rights: A Third Phase in the Global System?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
ninth and tenth U.N. operations or missions.23 These include two in
Africa: the United Nations Angola Verification Mission
(UNAVEM), a fledgling group of about 70 observers in Angola
which is supervising the withdrawal of Cuban troops, and a 4,500-
person "decolonization" force called the United Nations Transition
Advisory Group (UNTAG). The latter has gradually been
deployed in Namibia to supervise elections there and the transition
to independence. This force, which is the largest United Nations
peacekeeping force since the U.N.'s Congo operation of the early
1960s, will participate in all aspects of Namibia's path to indepen-
dence, from monitoring elections to helping the former colony draft
a constitution. Although the first U.N. troops deployed in Namibia
came under serious military attack, the overall mission has been
successful.
The tenth and last force, resulting from the Tela Agreement, is
the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). It is being
deployed throughout five of the seven countries of Central America
to ensure compliance with two provisions of the Agreement: the end
of military assistance to guerilla groups and the prohibition on al-
lowing state territory to be used for launching attacks on neighbor-
ing states.24 Another international body, the UN Mission for Verifi-
cation of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) was
established to accomplish that purpose with a minimum of person-
nel. The United Nations also stands ready to offer peacekeeping
assistance and to supervise referenda, plebiscites or elections, in
such troubled and war-weary battlegrounds as the Western Sahara
or Cambodia.25
These operations are, of course, expensive. Peace has its price.
For example, by the time Namibia achieves full independence, the
peacekeeping force there is expected to cost over $500 million (af-
ter being stripped down to essentials) and the new Iran-Iraq Mili-
tary Observer Group costs nearly $120 million a year. 6 Secretary
General Prez de Cu&llar estimates that missions in Western Sa-
hara, Cambodia, Central America and Southwest Africa could cost
23. Schwartz, Namibia: Birth of a nation, Interdependent, Winter 1989, at 1, col. 2.
24. Morello, supra note I1. The ONUCA package includes a military contingent, the
International Commission of Support and Verification (C1AV), to oversee demobilization,
disarmament and repatriation or resettlement of Contras in Honduras, the latter activity
under the auspices of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva.
25. Piasecki, supra note 22.
26. Schwartz, supra note 23.
[Vol. 20
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up to $1.5 billion a year,27 which is more than twice the regular
annual United Nations budget. That is one of the serious problems
in the current, second phase of U.N. efforts on behalf of global
security. The United States, for example, has been over $65 million
in arrears in paying just its peacekeeping assessment, and nearly
$600 million overall. Fortunately, however, it is beginning to pay its
full current assessments and arrearages over a period of five or six
years.28
III. UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKING, ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
As the United States once again gives the U.N. its dues, it would
seem appropriate to give it our due. The United Nations has, after
all, accomplished a great deal in encouraging and maintaining
global peace. Its efforts have extended to peacemaking as well as
peacekeeping. The United Nations has been especially involved in
arms control and peaceful settlement of disputes. Its efforts to facil-
itate arms control are rooted in the Atlantic Charter, 9 concluded
between Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941. The eighth clause of that
document emphasizes the need for disarmament, "pending the es-
tablishment of a wider and permanent system of general secur-
ity."'30 History has shown that the U.N.'s role in the process of con-
trolling arms is that of a catalyst, equipped with principles,
procedures and numerous venues for helping to turn swords into
plowshares.
The United Nations also helps make peace by encouraging the
peaceful settlement of disputes. In an era when national legal sys-
tems are rediscovering the merits of resolving disputes in imagina-
tive, more collaborative ways inside and outside the courtroom, the
27. Interdependent, Winter 1989, at 1, col. 1.
28. See Pickering, The U.S. and UN: The Decade Ahead, in United States Dep't of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 1232, Dec. 1989, at 2; see also Christ.
Sci. Monitor, Dec. 8, 1989, at 20, col. I (summary of the U.N. debt crisis as it pertains to
the U.S.); Saikowski, Washington debates when and how to pay its overdue UN bills,
Christ. Sci. Monitor, Aug. 3, 1988, at 3, col. 3.
29. Joint Declaration, known as the Atlantic Charter, by the President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, August 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1600,
E.A.S. 236; reproduced in H.S. COMMAGER, II DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 631 (6th
ed. 1958). See Laing, The Contribution of the Atlantic Charter to Human Rights Law and
Humanitarian Universalism, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 113 (1989).
30. Id.
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United Nations deserves credit for its ingenuity in fashioning tech-
niques for resolving disputes and preventing them from festering
into armed conflicts. Efforts to develop skilled mediation panels to
deter armed conflict and bring peace, such as the Organization of
African Unity arranged between Libya and Chad, are one example.
The World Court's advisory opinion on the Applicability of the Ob-
ligation to Arbitrate1 (otherwise known as the P.L.O. Mission
Case) makes an important contribution to the avoidance of conflict
by liberally defining the term "dispute" as a precondition for the
Court to swing into action. The Court's decision on jurisdiction and
admissibility in the case of Nicaragua against Honduras, 2 which
was subsequently withdrawn under the Tela Agreement, also fur-
thers the cause of peaceful dispute resolution. After the questiona-
ble process in Nicaragua's case against the United States, 3 where
the two parties to the dispute and the World Court seem to have
conspired to undermine the Rule of Law, the court has returned in
the two more recent cases to a modest but constructive role on be-
half of global peace and security by strengthening the jurispruden-
tial foundations and scaffolding for the peaceful settlement of
disputes.
What do these and similar efforts within the United Nations sys-
tem add up to besides a gargantuan cost? Clearly, the global com-
munity has the means and some momentum to keep hundreds of
lids on around the world, but with no assurance that the pots won't
boil over if we leave the room for even a moment. It is an ad hoc
approach. By contrast, "true security" Dostoevsky wrote, "is to be
found, in social solidarity rather than in isolated individual ef-
fort. '3 4 What kind of social solidarity would be feasible on a global
scale? What is the trend? As Eastern Europe's remarkable experi-
ence teaches, human rights is perhaps the most powerful form of
solidarity and, in the long run, our greatest hope for true global
security.
31. Application of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion of April 26).
32. Case Concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), 1988
I.C.J. 69 (Judgment on jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application of Dec.
20).
33. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27).
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IV. INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS
The protection of human rights strengthens both domestic and
international solidarity. The first article of the United Nations
Charter, no less, infuses the U.N.'s central purpose of maintaining
peace and security with a recognition of the importance of promot-
ing and encouraging respect for human rights. a5 Because a govern-
ment's treatment of people in its territory is of concern to us all, the
United Nations can supervise the implementation of human rights
in Member States even though Article 2(7) of the Charter31 ordi-
narily prohibits the organization from intervening in their domestic
jurisdiction.
Thus, for example, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights37 undertakes investigation of widespread abuses. The 45-
year-old Commission showed new boldness in 1989 by condemning
China for its suppression of the Tiananmen Square rally, the first
time it had ever taken such action against a permanent member of
the Security Council.
The European Court of Human Rights 8 addresses such funda-
mental issues as arbitrary detention, torture, due process, and free-
dom of the press. It found, for example, that the British govern-
ment violated the freedom of the press by attempting to enjoin the
Sunday Times from printing an investigative story about the phar-
maceutical industry. These decisions are taken seriously by govern-
ments because the European Court has the power to order repara-
tions for persons injured by governmental deprivation of human
rights. Closer to home, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ordered the Honduran government to compensate the families of
individuals who had "disappeared" under circumstances implicat-
35. U.N. CHARTER art. I paras. 1-4. For a good introduction to the international pro-
tection of human rights, see Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
36.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
37. See H. TOLLEY, JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987).
38. For a concise description of the European Court of Human Rights and its jurispru-
dence, see L. HENKIN, R. PUGH. 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1026 (2d ed. 1987).
1990]
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ing the government,39 and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights decided that the United States had violated the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man by allowing
South Carolina and Texas to put two minors on death row.4 °
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND
SECURITY
Human rights institutions can be viewed more broadly as part of
global peacekeeping. Conversely, deprivations of human rights en-
danger the peace, both because the effects of suffering and resulting
tensions may spill over national boundaries, and because internal
suppression and external aggression seem to go hand in bloody
hand. Autocratic governments, free of democratic constraints, often
seek to marshall domestic loyalty by encouraging a herd instinct
directed against a common enemy, as Immanuel Kant, among
others, observed 200 years ago. The relationship between security
and human rights is thus reciprocal. Less money for guns generally
means more money for butter. Disarmament releases money for
development.
A particularly intractable issue is how the global community
should respond effectively to gross violations of human rights in the
absence of external aggression. To what extent should the human
rights movement literally come out fighting? Is military interven-
tion on behalf of human rights, the idea of humanitarian interven-
tion, legitimate?41 Were unilateral U.S. interventions in Grenada
and Panama legitimate? Would any form of military intervention
in South Africa be legitimate? Ideally, only collective intervention
authorized by the Security Council should be acceptable, but in the
absence of a realistic mechanism of collective security, the principle
39. INTER-AM. COURT H.R. Godinez Cruz Cases, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989, Series
C. No. 5; INTER-AM. COURT H.R., Veldsquez Rodriquez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988,
Series C. No. 4.
40. INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., Res. 3/87, Case No. 9647, OAS/Ser. L/VII. 71, Doc. 9
(1987). See Fox, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds United States in Vio-
lation, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (1988).
41. F. TtSON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY
5 (1988). Other writings on humanitarian intervention include N. RONZITTI, RESCUING NA-
TIONALS ABROAD AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY (1985); Cf. Brownlie,
Humanitarian Intervention with Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brown-
lie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, LAW AND THE CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD 217, 229 (J. Moore ed. 1974).; Clark, Humanitarian Intervention: Help Your
Friends and State Practice, 13 GA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1983); Reisman, Coercion and Self-
Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); Schachter,
The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984).
[Vol. 20
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2 [2015], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol20/iss2/3
THE SECURITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
of self-help on behalf of human rights, vulnerable as it is to unilat-
eral abuse, may have merit. The world would be happier, of course,
if the protection of human rights did not have to rely sometimes on
military intervention. Eventually, global consensus on human rights
may help obviate the need for military intervention on their behalf.
Significantly, new expressions of multilateralism and the secure
feeling of glasnost and perestroika have helped, in a rather short
period of time, to bridge the ideological gap between the communi-
tarian, Eastern emphasis on economic, social and cultural rights of
peoples and the individualistic, Western emphasis on the civil and
political rights of individuals. It is about time. For too long, a
chicken-and-egg question has inhibited global implementation of
human rights, namely, which came first or should come first, the
individual or the community? In the West we have usually replied,
"the individual." The legal historian, Harold Berman, has chal-
lenged the conventional wisdom of an individualistic nativity by ob-
serving that in the early development of the Western legal systems,
the community came first.42 On the other hand, the growing ac-
knowledgment by some socialist states of individual political and
civil rights forms the other end of the bridge.
Whichever came first, both individual and community rights are
important, for true security requires an assurance not only of indi-
vidual freedoms of a political and civil character but more commu-
nitarian freedoms of a typically economic, social and cultural char-
acter-both freedoms "of" and freedoms "from." Just as military
security can be collective or individual, so can human rights. In-
deed, Western industrial societies must adjust themselves to a
world in which human rights are often viewed by other cultures as
belonging not to individuals but to entire tribes, nations and other
groups. There is thus a "moral need to strike the right balance be-
tween individualism and communitarianism"" in global efforts,
under Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter," to promote and
42.
The 'discovery of the individual' (as it has been called) in the late eleventh and
twelfth centuries, and the appearance at that time of the concept of individual rights
and liberties, were rooted in the coexistence and competition of a single corporate
church and diverse secular communities with overlapping political and legal juris-
dictions. The social contract securing individual rights originated at the same time
as a political reality, and only centuries later was transformed by political philoso-
phers into a theoretical construct.
Berman, Individualistic and Communitarian Theories of Justice: An Historical Approach,
21 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 549, 555 (1988).
43. Id. at 555.
44. Under Article 55 the United Nations must promote human rights, and under Arti-
1990]
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protect human rights.
In helping strike this balance, several institutions have assumed
greater responsibilities. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights is
still the global umbrella, but the European and Inter-American
Commissions and Courts of Human Rights are particularly promis-
ing. A two-year-old U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights has taken its place alongside its ten-year-old sister, the
Human Rights Committee, which was established to implement the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 5 Within both Committees
there is a clear trend toward tackling shared problems rather than
casting aspersions. The new Committee has reached the point of
considering how to apply the Covenant's provisions by means of
'"general comments," review and questioning of periodic reports
submitted by member states, and individual complaints filed under
the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.46
VI. TOWARD A THIRD, HUMAN RIGHTS-ORIENTED PHASE OF
GLOBAL SECURITY
Clearly, human rights law and enforcement is maturing. It is
time, therefore, to think and plan in terms of a new third phase of
post-war security that combines the second phase of peacemaking
and peacekeeping initiatives by the Secretary-General and General
Assembly, on the one hand, with the security of human rights on
the other. At this stage in history, that combination would seem to
be the best and most acceptable approach to collective security.47
After all, global security is not the handmaiden of sovereignty, but
of human dignity.
The fortieth anniversary of the Organization of American States
and Universal Declaration of Human Rights coincided with the
seventieth anniversary of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points,"8
which led to the creation of the League of Nations and served later
as an inspiration for the United Nations. In struggling to imple-
ment human rights as our best long-range hope for true global se-
cle 56 "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N.
CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
46. Alston & Simma, Second Session of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 603 (1988).
47. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1969
Wis. L. REV. 171, 187.
48. See H.S. COMMAGER, supra note 29, at 317.
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curity, it is well to recall the durability of the Wilsonian idea. The
United States jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes observed just one hun-
dred years ago that, "[t]o be seventy years young is sometimes far
more cheerful and hopeful than to be forty years old."" 9 A third,
human rights-oriented phase of global security will further invigor-
ate the ideal of peace within an increasingly mature institutional
framework.
49. O.W. HOLMES, ON THE SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY OF JULIA WARD HOWE, May 27,
19901
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